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The Proposed Securities Code: A
Sweeping Grant of Power to the
Securities and Exchange Commission
LEWIS D. LOWENFELS*
I. Introduction
The Code' is to me, in some ways, astounding, for lack of a
better word. If I were to say, "Let's get a group of people to-
gether and draft a code which gives more power to the federal
government and more power to the regulatory agencies to regu-
late private business," I think a good number of the people on
the panel would say they do not want to participate in anything
like that. To me, the Code does just that; I think that approach
makes no sense, at this time, in this country.
The Code gives more power to government in a number of
specific and important areas. As a result of that, I could not sup-
port that Code in any form. To give more power to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, to the federal bureaucracy, with
respect to private business and enterprise, is a mistake. This
country needs productivity, and one way to get productivity is
by fewer rules and regulations. The Commission is uniquely sit-
uated in our economy because it has so much power over the
private area.
This brings to mind a movie I saw a few weeks ago. I went
* LL.B., 1961, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1957, Harvard University; Partner, Tolins
& Lowenfels, New York City; Lecturer, Practising Law Institute; formerly, Lecturer,
Continuing Legal Education Program, University of Minnesota, 1975-76.
Substantial portions of this speech appeared in an article authored by Mr. Lowen-
fels which was published in the University of Virginia Law Review; this material is cited
extensively herein with the permission of that Review.
1. ALI FED. SEc. CODE (1978) (Proposed Official Draft). References in this speech
are to the 1978 draft. Comparison will be made with the ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1980)
(Official Draft) where the changes in the 1980 draft are significant.
2. Lowenfels, The Case Against the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 65 VA. L.
REv. 615 (1979).
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to see a picture called "Being There." s Melvyn Douglas plays
the role of an enormously successful businessman who is dying.
In one scene of the movie he remarks that "every businessman
in America today is at the mercy of these young lawyers from
the Commission who can come in and do anything they want."
Well, sadly enough, that is not that much of an overstatement.
You do not always deal with reasonable people like Lee Spencer
and Bob Pozen. I think you have to be very careful when you
grant a government agency this kind of power.
Now, let us examine the specific provisions of the Code
which delegate significant powers to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission.
II. An Analysis of the Proposed Code's Delegation of Power
to the Securities and Exchange Commission
A. The Power to Exempt from Any or All Provisions of the
Code
Section 303 of the Code gives the Commission plenary au-
thority to exempt by rule or order any person, security or trans-
action, or any class of persons, securities or transactions, from
any or all of the provisions of the Code.' Included within this
plenary power is the power to "condition or . . . make retro-
active any exemptive rule or order that it is authorized or re-
quired to adopt."' One might ask why anyone should get con-
cerned about the power to exempt. I suggest to you that the
3. The motion picture, Being There, was produced by Andrew Braunsberg and dis-
tributed by United Artists in 1979.
4. ALI FED. SEC. CoDE § 303 (1978). This section provides:
(a) [Commission.] The Commission, by rule or order, may exempt any per-
son, security, or transaction, or any class of persons, securities, or transactions,
from any or all of the provisions of this Code, except that section 303(a) does not
apply with respect to (1) section 1506 or 1904, (2) a provision that prohibits the
fixing of minimum profits or the imposition of any schedule, or the fixing of rates,
of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees, or (3) a rule of a bank regula-
tor or a self-regulatory organization.
See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 303, Comment (1)(a) (1980). This comment states that
the Commission's exemptive authority, apart from the plenary provisions in the
two 1940 Acts, is already quite extensive under the other Acts-to the point where
the logical solution is a Code-wide plenary authority subject to a few highly
policy-oriented exceptions.
5. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 303(c) (1978).
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power to exempt A is the power to destroy B, C and D who are
not exempted. The power to exempt is the power to bargain for
substantial concessions in exchange for that exemption.'
Furthermore, the power to exempt is the power to exempt
from the exemptions. There are certain provisions of this Code
which provide exemptions," but if the Commission has plenary
power to exempt, nothing is to stop them from exempting from
the exemptions. I think this proposed regulatory power is incom-
patible with the emphasis on disclosure which provides the pri-
mary theoretical basis of the Securities Act of 19338 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934.9 This extension of regulatory
power would bring a regulatory philosophy associated with the
Investment Company Act of 194010 into an area where it was
never intended to apply.
Finally, this provision in the Code will breed a small coterie
of securities lawyers who will specialize in these areas and who
will be able to bargain with the Commission to get certain ex-
emptions for their clients. Not that this is crooked, but it arises
by the nature of the relationships, according to the reality of the
world."
6. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 618.
7. Persons may be exempted under the following sections of the Code: § 242(b) (the
privileges and advantages of the limited offering); § 242(c) (trading transactions); and
§ 514(c) (local distribution exemptions). ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 242(b)-242(c), 514
(1978). Professor Loss and the Securities and Exchange Commission have agreed upon
changes to the proposed Code. SEC Sec. Act Release No. 33-6242, 20 SEC Docket 1483
(1980) [hereinafter cited and referred to as CODE RECOMMENDATION]. The CODE RECOM-
MENDATION includes a change which would grant the Commission additional rule-making
authority with respect to the definition of a "limited offering." CODE RECOMMENDATION,
supra, at 1486.
8. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1976)). This Act is based on a theory of investor protection through adequate
disclosure of sufficient information to permit informed investment decisions. Under this
Act the Commission does not have the power to prevent issuance of securities but may
compel disclosure of material facts concerning the company and its securities.
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1976)). This Act extends the disclosure doctrine of investor pro-
tection found in the 1933 Act by regulating transactions of, and compelling disclosure by,
corporations, directors, officers and shareholders.
10. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (1940) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)). This Act regulates specific acts
and transactions of investment companies and their employees.
11. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 617-19.
19811
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B. The Power to Promulgate Rules Proscribing Unfair Dealing
Section 915(b) of the proposed Code provides:
The Commission, by rule, may define in a manner not inconsis-
tent with the conditions and restrictions of sections 913, 914, and
915(a), and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, any
conduct by a broker, dealer . . .or investment adviser that is
made unlawful by those sections, or any similar conduct that con-
stitutes unfair dealing with a customer, client, or subscriber."2
What the Code is doing, in effect, is giving the Commission un-
precedented power to promulgate rules to regulate conduct that
constitutes "unfair dealing." That is far beyond anything that
we have had before.13 The reporter justifies this power by saying
that he is carving out a degree of misconduct, which is well
within the "proper sphere of direct regulation ' ' 14 and yet beyond
the ambit of the self-regulatory institutions, such as the New
York Stock Exchange. The reporter emphasizes that the conduct
reachable under this power, while "unfair," is not quite fraudu-
lent, so there is no reason to apply a fraud rule writ to it.16 This
is all very nice, and the intention may be very good, but I sug-
gest that what is going to happen is that the rule-making au-
thority of the Commission will be enlarged beyond the fraud
rule rubric of the "shingle" theory, which had been the tradi-
tional limit of their rule-making power.16 Now they are going to
be able to draft and promulgate rules in an entirely new area of
misconduct, an area somewhere between fraudulent and unethi-
cal, the area of "unfair dealing" with the customer. I think this
has very dangerous possibilities.1
12. ALI FED. SEC. CoDE § 915(b) (1978).
13. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 620.
14. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 915, Comment (1) (1978).
15. Id.
16. The "shingle" theory postulates that a dealer who hangs out his shingle implic-
itly warrants the soundness of stock and fair dealing. See Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 786 (1944). Under the "shingle" theory, the Commission's power was limited to
promulgating rules proscribing fraudulent conduct. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 915, Comment
(1) (1978). Under the Code, the outer limit of the Commission's power is no longer con-
fined to fraud, but is extended to include "unfair dealing." Id. § 915, Comment (3).
17. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 620..
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C. The Power to Regulate Investment Advisers
The third provision I find troublesome is the power to regu-
late investment advisers. The Commission has been trying for
some time to get a statute through the Congress to regulate in-
vestment advisers in a way different from that provided by the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.' 8 What they primarily want to
do is set up competency and financial requirements for invest-
ment advisers.'9 The Code would allow this,20 but existing stat-
utes do not.2 ' In spite of the failure of the last Congress to enact
bills which would have regulated advisers,22 the Code reporter
includes advisers among those subject to the Code's regula-
tions.as The reporter justifies this by what he sees as a lack of a
principled distinction between broker-dealers, who are regu-
lated, and investment advisers, who are not.24
The reporter is saying that if you are going to regulate bro-
ker-dealers in certain areas, you should also be able to regulate
investment advisers in the same areas. I suggest that this rea-
soning does not necessarily hold up. Broker-dealers differ from
investment advisers in three ways. First, broker-dealers make
substantial capital commitments and investments. Second, bro-
ker-dealers are intertwined in a network of trading with other
broker-dealers so that if one fails there is a domino effect of fail-
18. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). This Act requires registration of persons who advise others about securities trans-
actions and requires such advisers to protect investors.
19. See, e.g., Proposed Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S.
2849, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Ric. 307-18 (1976); H.R. 13737, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
20. See, e.g., ALI FED. SEc. CODE § 705(b) (1978). This section states:
(b) [Required rules.] The Commission shall adopt rules under section 705(a)
that (1) establish minimum financial responsibility requirements, and (2) require
the maintenance of reserves with respect to customers' deposits or credit balances.
21. Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Commission is granted broad
discretion, including the authority to revoke an investment adviser's registration for pub-
lishing misleading information, Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968), but the Commission's broad discretion does not
touch on financial responsibilities of investment advisers. Indicating that revocation is a
"severe sanction," the court in Marketlines upheld the Commission's power to revoke an
investment adviser's registration where "the Commission could reasonably find" that
revocation "was necessary to protect the investing public." Id. at 267.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 703(e)(1) (1978).
24. Id. § 703(e)(1), Comment (4).
1981]
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ure which could be disastrous. Finally, broker-dealers are in-
sured by a federal agency, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation.2 5 Investment advisers, however, do not share these
characteristics: they do not make substantial capital invest-
ments, they are not intertwined with other entities in a way that
could cause interrelated failures, and they are not insured by the
Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
In addition, I am not sure that a federal bureaucracy should
set competency requirements for investment advisers. Nor do I
think the bureaucracy should approve whether a particular in-
vestment adviser, who may have a technical theory or chart the-
ory or whatever, should necessarily not be allowed to practice his
trade. Let the market place determine that. If he is successful,
he will do well. If he is not successful, he will not do well. That
will happen very quickly.
D. The Power to Extend Extraterritorial Application of the
Federal Securities Law
The next section of the Code I wish to discuss concerns the
extraterritorial application of the federal securities law. Section
1905(c)(1) states that:
Within the limits of international law and section 1905(a)(1)(D),
and in the light of the significance or effects within the United
States of particular acts or conduct, the Commission, by rule,
(1) may provide (A) that this Code does not apply with re-
spect to the subject matter of section 1905(a), (B) that it does
apply with respect to the subject matter of section 1905(b), and
(C) that it does or does not apply with respect to any other sub-
ject matter."
So, in effect, you have a provision which says there are
things that shall be governed by the Code, and there are things
beyond the scope of the Code, but the Commission can change
that all around by rule if they want to. That presents a problem.
If one section enumerates the types of extraterritorial situations
to which the Code would apply and another section describes
25. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1976
& Supp. III 1979). Since broker-dealers are, in essence, insured by the public treasury,
there may be justification for some regulation.
26. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1905(c)(1) (1978).
[Vol. 1:335
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the types of extraterritorial situations to which the Code does
not apply, why should the Commission be given rule-making
power to change all that? It seems to me that in the extraterrito-
rial area the focus is on such diverse issues as comity between
nations, antitrust considerations or jurisdictional matters; these
concerns may be more important in the particular situation than
the protection of investors and securities, which is the primary
interest of the Commission. So I suggest that in this particular
area the federal courts may be more competent to weigh and
evaluate the interests involved than the Commission.
E. The Power to Create Private Actions for Customers of
Self-Regulatory Institutions
Self-regulatory institutions write private rules which, in
part, govern their relationships with their customers. Customers,
aggrieved by a violation of these rules, may go to federal court
seeking redress. Under existing law, the federal courts determine
on a case by case basis whether to imply a private action for
damages in favor of a customer based upon the particular
rules. 28 Under section 1721 of the Code, however, the Commis-
sion would be empowered to determine in what situations a cus-
tomer would and would not have private rights of action.2'
27. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 624.
28. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Gurvitz v. Bregman & Co., 379 F. Supp.
1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Colonial, the court found that where there is no express private
cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for violation of exchange or
dealer association rules, "the court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its
place in the regulatory scheme" to determine if a private cause of action is to be implied.
358 F.2d at 182. The Buttrey court found that whether a private cause of action can be
implied under the New York Stock Exchange "know your customer" rule depends on the
factual allegations of each case. 410 F.2d at 143. The Gurvitz court found that allegations
that stock brokers failed to keep proper records in violation of NASD rules did not con-
stitute a private cause of action. 379 F. Supp. at 1286-87. See generally Lowenfels, Im-
plied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 12 (1966); Low-
enfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied
Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNmL L.Q. 633 (1966).
29. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1721(a) (1978). This section states:
(a) [Determination of rules to which section applies.] A member of or partici-
pant in a self-regulatory organization who violates a rule of the organization, or a
broker or dealer within section 905(c) who violates a rule under that section, is
liable to his customer for any loss caused by the violation if
1981]
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Now it seems to me, again, that this ought to be governed
by the federal courts. There is presently a split of authority as to
whether, and in what circumstances, private rights of action are
available. Under section 1721, the Commission would have the
power to decide these questions; I suggest, as in the extraterrito-
rial area, that the Commission is not the proper party to weigh
these particular interests.30 Furthermore, why do it by rule? The
creation of private rights of action is particularly suited to a case
by case analysis. The plaintiff has to come into court anyway.
He has to sue for damages. He has to establish causation. He has
to establish fault. Why not let the court, with the plaintiff pre-
sent, determine the situations under which a private right of ac-
tion can be implied?
F. The Power to Impound and Place in Escrow
Under Section 506, the Commission may, by rule, require
that'any securities issued within the past three years be placed
in escrow.3' The Commission would also have the same power
with respect to certain stock to be issued to a promoter at a bar-
gain price." There is also a similar provision for impounding.
33 I
(1) the rule violated has been determined by Commission rule to be within
section 1721, or
(2) a court, except when the rule violated has been determined by Commis-
sion rule to be without section 1721, decides that a private right of action under
this Code should be recognized in accordance with the principles of common law
and equity, applied as a matter of Federal jurisprudence, and the standards of
section 1722(a).
This section remains substantially the same in the 1980 draft but "municipal dealers"
and "municipal brokers" have been added as regulated parties. ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1721(a) (1980).
30. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
31. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 506. This section provides:
[Escrow and impounding.] With respect to an offering statement, the Commission
by rule
(a) may require that any securities issued within the past three years or to
be issued to a promoter for a consideration substantially different from the offer-
ing price to other persons be placed in escrow or otherwise restricted;
(b) may require, when the distribution is by or for the account or benefit of
the issuer, that the proceeds be impounded until the issuer receives a specified
amount; and
(c) may specify the conditions of any escrow, impounding, or other restric-
tions so required.
32. Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/5
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suggest that section 506 is without precedent under the federal
securities laws. 4 Here the Code is clearly discarding the tradi-
tional disclosure philosophy that has always dominated the area
of public offerings of securities in favor of a regulatory approach.
In addition, I suggest that section 506 authorizes a federal
agency to intrude into areas of corporate finance which were
previously governed by the private sector.,3
A number of states do have escrow provisions.8 Such pro-
visions create problems for an offering, particularly that of a
young company. When the stock is in escrow, the situation is
frozen: a company has an offering, its stock is in escrow, then a
year and a half down the road, when the company has run
through a good portion of the money, it needs more money to
finish the design on a new product, or whatever. To go out and
make a private placement of securities, or to go out and find a
huge company to merge with in order to get additional financ-
ing, is much more difficult when a good chunk of the company's
own stock is held in escrow by some state commission. It just
scares off additional venture capital. I suggest that instead of
protecting the public investor, this sort of an escrow mechanism
becomes an onerous government instrument which freezes the
public's investment into a nonproductive limbo.3
33. Id.
34. The only rule in the federal area which governs escrow funds in this context is
rule 253. 17 C.F.R. § 230.253 (1980). Rule 253(c)(2) provides:
(c) In computing the amount of securities which may be offered hereunder,
there shall be included,. . . (2) All securities issued to and held by or proposed to
be issued, pursuant to options or otherwise, to any director, officer or promoter of
the issuer, or to any underwriter, dealer or security salesman: Provided, That such
securities need not be included to the extent that effective provision is made, by
escrow arrangements or otherwise, to assure that none of such securities or any
interest therein will be reoffered to the public within one year after the com-
mencement of the offering hereunder and that any reoffering of such securities
will be made in accordance with the applicable provisions of the act.
35. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 627.
36. See, e.g., HAwAII REv. STAT. § 485-18 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1259(d)
(Cum. Supp. 1979); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 451.705(f) (Supp. 1980-1981); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 551.27(7) (West 1979). See Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 627 n. 64 for a listing of
states which have escrow provisions.
37. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 627.
1981]
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G. The Power to Decide Indemnification and Contribution
Issues
I would next like to examine the area of indemnification
and contribution, for the Code substantially expands the Com-
mission's power in these areas. Section 1724(e)(3) of the Code
provides:
An indemnification provision, whether contained in a statute, a
bylaw or similar instrument, or a contract . . . , is valid, apart
from the expenses of a successful defense, only to the extent that
(A) the Commission provides by rule on consideration of
such factors as the respective gains and losses of the indemnitor
and indemnitee and the deterrent effect of the particular type of
liability, or
(B) a court determines in accordance with the principles of
common law and equity....
This puts the agency on the same level as a federal court.
There are additional provisions with respect to contribution and
indemnification which further expand the Commission's author-
ity.3 9 Together these provisions, it seems to me, represent a sub-
stantial federal instrusion into areas traditionally governed by
state law. The reporter in this area has no policy justification for
what he has done. It seems to me that unless federal uniformity
in this area has become a vital interest, this is an area that the
Commission was not set up to get involved in or to administer.
The Commission was created by Congress to administer and en-
force the federal securities laws. 0 Its expertise has been devel-
oped during the past 45 years through dealing primarily with
these comparatively narrow and limited statutes. The Commis-
sion was not set up to be a federal corporation commission exer-
cising regulatory powers over corporate officets and directors
through principles of federal corporate law. Moreover, questions
38. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1724(e)(3) (1978).
39. See, e.g., ALI FED. SEC. CODE §§ 1724(f) (contribution), 1819(k) (improper in-
demnification), 1728(a) (filing of litigation documents for indemnification) (1978).
40. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 629. The Commission was created by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4, 48 Stat. 885 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 78d). Compare J. ELLENBERGER, & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURrrIES ACT OF 1933 AND SEcuRrrms EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) with Securities
and Exchange Commission, in 4 THE ECONOmiC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY
(B. Schwartz ed. 1973).
[Vol. 1:335
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of indemnification and contribution often involve delicate nego-
tiations among individual officers, directors, insurance compa-
nies and their lawyers. To involve the federal government in this
area adds an additional power group, so to speak, that has to be
included in the negotiations. I think this is unnecessary and
wrong.
H. The Power to Alter the Code's Complete Elimination of
Exemptions to Rule 10b-6
The next Code section I wish to discuss is the one dealing
with rule 10b-6.41 Rule 10b-6 is a complicated rule under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and has a very substantial effect
upon the trading markets.4 2 In essence, rule 10b-6 makes it un-
lawful for a person connected with the distribution of securities
to bid for or purchase any securities that are the subject of the
distribution.4 8 There are, however, eleven exemptions from the
41. ALI FED. S.c. CODE § 1609(d) (1978).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1980).
43. Id. Rule 10b-6 states:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as
used in section 10(b) of the act for any person,
(1) Who is an underwriter or propective underwriter in a particular distribu-
tion of securities, or
(2) Who is the issuer or other person on whose behalf such a distribution is
being made, or
(3) Who is a broker, dealer, or other person who has agreed to participate or
is participating in such a distribution, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange, either alone or with one or more other per-
sons, to bid for or purchase for any account in which he has a beneficial interest,
any security which is the subject of such distribution, or any security of the same
class and series, or any right to purchase any such security, or to attempt to in-
duce any person to purchase any such security or right, until after he has com-
pleted his participation in such distribution: Provided, however, That this section
shall not prohibit (i) transactions in connection with the distribution effected oth-
erwise than on a securities exchange with the issuer or other person or persons on
whose behalf such distribution is being made or among underwriters, prospective
underwriters, or other persons who have agreed to participate or are participating
in such distribution; (ii) unsolicited privately negotiated purchases, each involving
a substantial amount of such security, effected neither on a securities exchange
nor from or through a broker or dealer; or (iii) purchases by an issuer effected
more than forty days after the commencement of the distribution for the purpose
of satisfying a sinking fund or similar obligation to which it is subject; or (iv) odd-
lot transactions (and the off-setting round-lot transactions hereinafter referred to)
by a person registered as an odd-lot dealer in such security on a national securities
11
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rule, and it is these exemptions which make the rule workable
and livable within the practical everyday world of financing.""
The Code reporter has codified rule 10b-6, but he has left out
the exemptions. 5 He says that we could leave it to the good will
exchange who offsets such odd-lot transactions in such security by round-lot
transactions as promptly as possible; or (v) brokerage transactions not involving
solicitation of the customer's order; or (vi) offers to sell or the solicitation of offers
to buy the securities being distributed (including securities or rights acquired in
stabilizing) or securities or rights offered as principal by the person making such
offer to sell or solicitation; or (vii) the exercise of any right or conversion privilege
to acquire any security; or (viii) stabilizing transactions not in violation of §
240.10b-7; or (ix) bids for or purchases of rights not in violation of § 240.10b-8; or
(x) transactions effected on a national securities exchange in accordance with the
provisions of a plan filed by such exchange under § 240.10b-2(d) and declared
effective by the Commission; or (xi) purchases or bids by an underwriter, prospec-
tive underwriter or dealer otherwise than on a securities exchange, 10 or more
business days prior to the proposed commencement of such distribution (or 5 or
more business days in the case of unsolicited purchases), if none of such purchases
or bids are for the purpose of creating actual, or apparent, active trading in or
raising the price of such security. In the case of securities offered pursuant to an
effective registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 the distribution
shall not be deemed to commence for purposes of this subdivision prior to the
effective date of the registration statement.
(b) The distribution of a security (1) which is immediately exchangeable for
or convertible into another security, or (2) which entitles the holder thereof imme-
diately to acquire another security, shall be deemed to include a distribution of
such other security within the meaning of this section.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6(a)(3)(i) to -6(a)(3)(xi) (1980).
45. ALI FED. SEc. CODE §1609(d) (1978). The Code proposes to codify rule 10b-6 as
follows:
(d) [Buying during a distribution.] (1) Except as permitted by rule or order of the
Commission, it is unlawful for the issuer, a secondary distributor, an underwriter, a pro-
spective underwriter, or any other person who has agreed to participate or is participat-
ing or otherwise financially interested in a distribution, to do any of the following acts
before the completion of his participation or the termination of his financial interest in
the distribution:
(A) to bid for or buy, for an account in which he has a beneficial interest, a security
that is the subject of the distribution or a security of the same class (or a warrant or
right to subscribe to or buy such a security);
(B) to induce or attempt to induce another person to bid for or buy such a security
(or a warrant or right to subscribe to or buy such a security) from a person not partici-
pating in the distribution; or
(C) to pay or offer to agree to pay (i) any compensation to a nonparticipant in the
distribution for soliciting a third person to buy such a security (or a warrant or right to
subscribe to or buy such a security), or (ii) more than an ordinary salary or the custom-
ary compensation to a participant in the distribution (if it is on an exchange) for solicit-
ing a third person to make such a purchase.
(2) "Prospective underwriter" means a person who (A) has submitted or agreed to
submit a bid to become an underwriter pursuant to a public invitation for bids, or (B)
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of the Commission to promulgate these exemptions as part of its
rule-making power." It seems to me that this is a real problem,47
because within recent years, the Commission has jealously ex-
panded its authority in the rule 10b-6 area through a series of
many "no-action" letters.48 Now we have a situation where the
exemptions are out, the rule is stated in prohibitive terms, and
we have to await the Commission's pleasure with respect to put-
ting the exemptions back.
has reached an understanding with the issuer or secondary distributor that he will be-
come an underwriter, whether or not the terms of the underwriting have been agreed
upon.
(3) Notwithstanding section 242, for purposes of section 1609(d)
(A) the Commission may define "distribution" by rule on consideration of such fac-
tors as size (absolute or relative) of the offering, number of sellers and buyers, selling
method, characteristics of the market used, and compensation; and
(B), unless the Commission provides otherwise by rule or order, (i) a distribution of
securities of a class that is immediately convertible into or entitles its holders immedi-
ately to acquire securities of another class of the same issuer (or another issuer) is a
distribution also of the securities of the other class, but (ii) the fact that a class of a type
specified in section 1609(d)(3)(B)(i) is outstanding is not a distribution of securities of
the other class.
(4) Section 1609(d) does not apply to (A) an exempted security within section 302(a)
to (c) inclusive, except to the extent that the Commission provides otherwise by rule, or
(B) an investment company's redemption of a redeemable security of which it is the
issuer.
46. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1609(d), Comment (3) (1980).
47. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 631.
48. No-action letters have been described as follows:
The SEC staff receives and replies to thousands of written inquiries about the
securities laws. The inquirer must give the facts-typically a proposed transac-
tion-and his or her opinion on the applicable law. The staff of the appropriate
Division of the SEC (e.g., Corporation Finance, Market Regulation) replies, typi-
cally saying no more than that if the transaction is carried out as proposed, the
staff will not (or will) recommend that the Commission take enforcement action.
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURrTIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, Sec. 1.3(160),
at 1:15 (1979) (citations omitted). See generally Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action" Letters:
Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1256 (1971), reprinted in
L. LOWENFELS, SELECTED AaTIcLas UNEs THE FEDERAL SEcuRrrms LAWS (1978); Lock-
hart, SEC No-Action Letters: Informal Advice as a Discretionary Administrative Clear-
ance, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 95 (1972); Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts
with Existing Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REy. 303 (1973),
reprinted in L. LowENELS, SELECTED ARTicLEs UNDER THE FEDERAL SEcuRrrias LAWS
(1978).
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I. The Power to Modify the Code's Objective Standards with
Respect to Private Placement and Trading Transaction
Exemptions
I will discuss the private placement and trading transaction
exemptions only briefly because these topics were covered in
depth earlier." Section 242 of the Code authorizes private place-
ment and trading exemptions, and establishes objective criteria
that must be met to qualify as a "limited offering."0 But the
Code also permits the Commission to modify, by rule, the condi-
tions in section 242(b) or to impose additional conditions with
respect to the type of issue, the kind of market and similar cri-
teria.5 1 So in effect you have a rule which provides an exemp-
tion, and, again, the Commission is given power to exempt from
the exemption. I do not see that power as necessary.
J. The Power Over One-Year Registrants
As has been said earlier today, one of the more important
aspects of the Code is the shift in emphasis from the occasional,
hit or miss, static registration statement to the creation of a sys-
tem characterized by permanent company registration. 2 One in-
novation created in connection with this change is the preferred
one-year registrant status,53 which confers a number of privi-
49. Ratner, Exemptions to the Disclosure Requirements, 1 PACE L. REV. 319 (1981).
50. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b)(1) (1978). The Code defines a limited offering as an
offering in which the following objectively determinable conditions are present:
(A) The initial buyers of the securities are institutional investors or not more
than thirty-five other persons or both, or the seller reasonably so believes; (B)
resales . . . within three years after the last sale . . . to any of the initial buyers
other than institutional investors do not result in more than thirty-five owners of
those securities (apart from any institutional investors and persons who become
owners otherwise than by purchase) at any one time, unless any such excess re-
suits from resales pursuant to an offering statement or an exemption; and (C) the
seller and all resellers comply with any rules adopted under section 242(b)(4).
Id. The CODE RECOMMENDATION includes a change in this section which would grant the
Commission additional rule-making authority with respect to the definition of a "limited
offering." CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 7, at 1486.
51. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b) (1978). For a comparison with the CODE RECOM-
MENDATION, see note 50 supra.
52. Spencer, Issuer Registration and Distributions, 1 PACE L. REV. 299, 299 (1981).
53. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.16 (1978).
"One-year registrant" means a registrant that has been continuously a registrant
for one year.
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leges upon a company: certain exemptions from registration
requirements," more lenient treatment with respect to the con-
tents of offering statements and prospectuses," shorter holding
periods under the private placement exemption, 57 and protec-
tions against disaffirmances." These privileges are valuable.
But the Code also grants to the Commission the power to
take away summarily, without a hearing, the valued one-year
registrant status of issuers. Under section 1808(a) of the Code,
the Commission is freely authorized, as it deems necessary or
appropriate, to suspend the company's one-year registrant sta-
tus.9 Only after the suspension has been implemented does the
issuer have a right to a hearing. 0 Once suspended, the issuer
cannot recover its one-year registrant status until it has been a
registrant continuously for a period of one year after the suspen-
sion has been vacated. 1 I think it is dangerous to give a govern-
ment agency this kind of unfettered right. The leverage which
the Commission would obtain over every registered public com-
pany in this country would be incalculable. Consider, for exam-
ple, an agency investigation, when a company is locking horns
with the Commission's enforcement people in an adversary pro-
ceeding. The company views the situation one way, and the en-
forcement people view it another. If the enforcement division
has the power to take away the company's one-year registrant
status, by recommending that action to an agreeable Commis-
Id.
54. ALI FED. SEc. CODE §§ 502(b), 512(c), 512(g), 512(h) (1978). These sections re-
main substantially the same in the 1980 draft at sections 502(b), 512(3), 512(7), 512(8),
respectively, except that in the 1980 Code § 512(7) and 512(8) refer to "a transaction in a
security" rather than the "offer or sale of a security" language used in the 1978 draft.
ALI FED. SEc. CODE §§ 502(b), 512(3), 512(7), 512(8) (1980).
55. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 502(c) (1978).
56. Id. § 505(a).
57. Id. § 242(b)(2).
58. Id. § 504(b).
59. Id. § 1808(a).
60. Id. § 1817(b)(5). This section provides as follows:
The Commission or a bank regulator shall give prompt notice of the issuance of a
summary order under section 1808(a), (f) or (h), 1809(f), 1810(a)(2) or 1811(c),
and of opportunity for hearing within not more than fifteen days on whether it
should be vacated.
61. Id. § 299.16. For the text of this section, see note 53 supra.
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sion, enormous power is given to the government."2
K. The Power to Suspend Trading Summarily
Under existing law, the Commission 'has the power to sus-
pend trading summarily, but only for a period of ten days.6 For
years, the Commission, not being satisfied with the ten-day
power, would issue a suspension for ten days, then renew the
ten-day suspension ad infinitum. Well, somebody got the cour-
age and financing together and decided to challenge the Com-
mission's tactics. The United States Supreme Court agreed with
the challenge and, in SEC v. Sloane, held that only one ten-day
suspension was permissible."
Under the Code, that is changed. The Code reverses Sloane,
and it gives the Commission power to "by order ... summarily
suspend trading in any security other than a Government or mu-
nicipal security" without any ten-day limitation." This, I sug-
gest, is something we do not need. 6
L. The Power to Regulate Trust Indentures
Section 309(e) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as empowering the
Commission to conduct an investigation or other proceeding for
the purpose of determining whether the provisions of an inden-
ture which has been qualified under this subchapter are being
62. Lowenfels, supra note 2, 633-34.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976). This section provides:
If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require, the
Commission is authorized summarily to suspend trading in any security (other
than an exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten days, or with the ap-
proval of the President, summarily to suspend all trading on any national securi-
ties exchange or otherwise, in securities other than exempted securities, for a
period not exceeding ninety days. No member of a national securities exchange,
broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale
of, any security in which trading is so suspended.
64. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978). The Court held that the Commission lacked
authority under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to issue a series of sum-
mary suspension orders which allowed suspension of trading beyond the stated ten-day
period. The holding was based on the clear language of the statute which contains no
authority for extension. Id. at 122-23.
65. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 903(d)(2) (1978).
66. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 635-36.
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complied with, or to enforce such provisiois.67
If you go back into the legislative history you will find that
Congress specifically did not want any government interference
in this area." They thought that giving the power to investigate
in this area would be an enormous injustice to some of the peo-
ple involved." Under the Code, however, that limitation is
thrown out. The Commission would have the power to investi-
gate in this area just as in any other.
III. Summary
The sections I have just discussed are only some of the more
salient examples of the Code's sweeping grant of additional
power to the Commission. If you go through the Code section by
section, you will find one or more of the following provisions in
almost every section: "To the extent that the Commission so
prescribes by rule";7 0 "except that the Commission may impose
conditions or withdraw this exemption by rule"; 7' "[i]t is unlaw-
ful for any person in contravention of the rules of the Commis-
sion";7 12 "shall file whatever reports the Commission prescribes
by rule";7" "within whatever shorter period the Commission
specifies by rule."' 4 These provisions are, it is true, present in
existing federal securities law, but they do not have the same
unlimited degree of application contemplated in the Code.
In closing, I would just like to say that the grant of addi-
tional power to the Commission is hard to justify. I think that it
was done for two reasons. First, the reporter wanted to get the
Commission's support for the Code, because he felt that this
Code was not going to go through Congress without that sup-
port. Second, in a lot of areas the world of the scholar competed
67. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 309(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77iii(e) (1976).
68. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 637-38. Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
Report on Trust Indenture Act of 1939, S. Rep. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1939);
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report on Trust Indenture Bill of
1939, H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Seas. 26-27 (1939).
69. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 637-38.
70. See, e.g., ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 299.24 (1978).
71. See, e.g., id. § 512(i).
72. See, e.g., id. § 1311(c).
73. See, e.g., id. § 605(a)(1).
74. See, e.g., id. § 512(b)(2).
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with the hard world of reality. While the Code was being
drafted, particular provisions might have been drafted in a cer-
tain way. But when the special interests got involved in the
drafting process and insisted that the Code would not pass with
a certain provision in it, the reporter would just back off and
say, "Well then, let's just say it shall be handled in such a way
as the Commission shall provide by rule." That was a nice way
of avoiding the problem and putting it under the rug until the
future.75
I suggest, for your consideration, that this inability to make
choices and this desire for the support of the Commission are
hardly sound policy reasons for the Code's expansion of regula-
tory power in the corporate securities field. For those reasons I
would oppose the Code. Furthermore, I do not think that the
Code adds anything substantial; most of the improvements
which the Code suggests have been enacted piecemeal by rule or
statute over the past few years.76
In addition, a trend of contraction is apparent from recent
Supreme Court decisions. This limiting trend clashes with the
natural bent of any bureaucracy, here the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, to expand its power. I think it is good that
75. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 640.
76. Id. at 661.
77. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423
U.S. 232 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Court in Aaron held that, regardless of
the plaintiff's identity or the nature of the relief sought, scienter is an element of a viola-
tion of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of rule lob-5. Scienter is
also an element of a violation of section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 446 U.S. at
697, 701. The Court in TSC Indus. defined a material fact as one involving substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would have regarded the fact as significant in
his deliberations. 426 U.S. at 449. The Court in Ernst & Ernst held that proof of scienter
is required for a rule 10b-5 violation. 425 U.S. at 193. The Court in Foremost-McKesson
found that there is no section 16(b) liability when the defendant is not a ten percent
owner before the purchase and sale alleged to constitute a violation. 423 U.S. at 259. The
Court in Rondeau found that there is no violation of section 13(d)(1) when the failure to
disclose was made in good faith and without injury to the plaintiff. 422 U.S. at 61-62.
The Court in Blue Chip Stamps found that plaintiffs who are neither purchasers nor
sellers of the security in question have no standing under rule 10b-5. 421 U.S. at 754-55.
See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEo. L.J. 891 (1977).
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the courts are containing bureaucratic expansion; the Code
would, by increasing the Commission's power, reverse this judi-
cial trend. I am opposed to that.
IV. Discussion
Question: I have asked Professor Loss the questions you
raise, and his answer was as you surmised: codification is a com-
promise. You will not get the Code passed unless the Commis-
sion approves. My question to you is this: isn't compromise too
dear a price to pay for codification, when the Code doesn't com-
port with the spirit of deregulation now so prevalent?
Mr. Lowenfels: First, the compromise is too dear a price to
pay, and second, I see no reason for the Code. If you examine
what Professor Loss has been saying time after time, he feels
that we are bogged down in a morass of securities law, a thicket
from which nobody can emerge. I practice every day in the field
of corporate securities law, and I feel that it is manageable, that
it is a coherent body of law that is relatively uncomplex in our
complex society. I do not have a problem dealing with it. I think
that his whole idea that we need a Code is a straw man.
Question: I would like to get back to your point on the
Commission's power to suspend trading summarily. It is true
that the Code section you cited would remove the ten-day limi-
tation on that power. But section 1817(b)(5) states that there
has to be an opportunity for a hearing within 15 days on
whether that order should be vacated, 8 so it is not quite so
harsh as you make it. The Commission would have to give the
issuant prompt notice of the summary order and of an opportu-
nity of a hearing within 15 days after the day of its issuance. 7
They are in pea soup, even in the worst case, for a few days, but
they do have a chance for a hearing within a reasonably prompt
time. This is arguably so even in the case of ongoing fraud.
Mr. Lowenfels: There are a number of answers to that. One
is that you can not always prepare for a hearing within 15 days,
for these things often take much longer. More importantly the
78. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1817(b)(5) (1978).
79. Id.
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stigma of an article in the Wall Street Journal is almost as bad
as being suspended from the "one-year registrant" status. It is
going to affect your relationship with your banks and your
customers.
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